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Amato v. The Queen1: A Precedent For Entrapment
In 1977 Victor Amato was arrested and charged with two counts of 
trafficking in cocaine. The arrest and subsequent charges were the result 
of over two .months of solicitation by a police informer and an undercover 
agent to obtain cocaine from Amto. The purpose of the operation was to 
get to Amato’s supplier. It took nearly two months of daily contact to induce 
Amato to sell two small amounts of cocaine.
At his trial, Amato raised the defence of entrapment, however, it was 
rejected as there was not enough evidence to show that the scheme had 
been instigated by the police..2 The British Columbia Court of Appeal 
dismissed the appeal,5 holding that entrapm ent was not available as a def­
ence to a criminal charge. Taggart J. held that the court’s jearlier decision 
in R. v. Chem icki4 should be followed. In that decision entrapm ent was 
rejected as a defence until “such time as the matter is definitively settled 
by the Supreme Court of Canada or by a division of this Court composed 
of five members . . .”5 Seaton J. also rejected the proposition that entrap­
ment afforded a defence but noted, that the police-informer, and not the 
police, had importuned the accused.6 In Mr. justice Seaton’s view, this 
method of apprehending criminals did not constitute entrapment.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the issues in the Amato 
case divided the Court. A majority of five to four held that the accused 
had not been entrapped and hence the defence was not available. However, 
a second majority of five to four held that entrapm ent was a proper defence 
available to an accused on a criminal charge. After years of having left the 
question open, the court appeared ready to respond to the issue.
Canadian courts have discussed the defence of entrapment but always 
in the absence of a “proper case” in which to apply it. In Regina v. Ormerod7 
Laskin J. as he then was, briefly discussed entrapment. Although he found 
the defence was not available to the accused in that case, he defined en­
trapm ent as “. . . such calculated inveigling and persistent importuning of 
the accused . . .  as to go beyond ordinary solicitation . . .”8 The use of police
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decoys or agent piovocateurs to ensnare a thief was not enough. For the 
defence to operate, something more was needed, and this something more 
was “persistent im portuning.”
Despite the lack of direction on this def ence, one Ontario County Court 
judge did accept the defence of entrapment. Regina v. Shipley9 records the 
first instance in which the defence of entrapm ent was successf ully raised. 
There the police officer, working undercover, admitted that the evidence 
he wished to build was against some suppliers, and that he had taken 
advantage of a naive youth who would not have obtained the narcotic for 
him had it not been for the officer’s inducements. The court stayed the 
prosecution as an abuse of process.
Such a small step toward recognition of the defence was set back by 
the decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in R. v. Chem icki10 
where the Court rejected the accused’s defence of entrapm ent, holding 
that such a defence was not available. However, the Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal took the opposite view." While the court held that it was not an 
available defence in that particular case, MacDonald J. in obiter said:
. . . that proceedings should be staved or the accused discharged if it is clear that 
the accused did not have a prior intention or predisposition to commit the of f ence 
with which he is charged but committed it only because the conduct of the agent 
provocateur was (as Laskin J.A. said in Regina v. Ormerod): Such calculating in­
veigling and and persistent importuning as went bevond ordinary solicitation.12
Like the County Court Judge in Shipley, MacDonald J. took the view 
that such police conduct constituted an abuse of process and was contrary 
to public policy, in that courts should not be open to cases which arise out 
of police instigated crime.13
The public policy concerns and the very nature of entrapm ent received 
more attention and greater elaboration in 1978 when K irzner14 went before 
the Supreme Court of Canada, on appeal from the Ontario court of Appeal. 
The latter held that not only was the defence of entrapm ent not available 
to the accused, but that it did not constitute a defence recognized at law.15 
The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the Appeal Court’s decision with 
respect to Kirzner’s particular case but felt that the question of whether
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entrapm ent was generally available as a defence should be left open, to be 
decided when a proper case came before the court.
The Kirzner decision provided the Court with an opportunity to restate 
some basic principles with respect to entrapm ent. Laskin C.J. defined en­
trapm ent as police conduct which went beyond mere solicitation or decoy 
work, but which set out to actively “organize a scheme of ensnarement . . .  in 
order to prosecute the person so caught.”16 The key element in the defence 
is held to be the role played by the police, and whether that role is one of 
instigating the crime, rather than merely providing an environ for a crim­
inally predisposed individual.17
The policy reasons underlying the defence are set out at length in 
Kirzner. The Court does not object to the use of police decoys or agent 
provocateurs, but rather; to police conceiving a crime, and then through 
trickery, persuasion or fraud procuring its commission from an innocent 
citizen. Such police tactics can only serve to bring the administration to 
justice into disrepute.18
The third issue, discussed in Kirzner but not settled, was whose conduct 
the court was going to scrutinize in determining the applicability of the 
entrapm ent defence, i.e., whether courts would look to the conduct of the 
accused or to that of the police. Courts in the United States opted for 
looking to the conduct of the accused. This approach has been referred 
to as the subjective approach, and is derived from the majority decision of 
the U nit'd  States Supreme Court in Sorrells v. The United States.19 The test 
applied in that case was the accused’s predisposition toward committing 
the crime. If he was so predisposed, then the defence of entrapm ent would 
not arise. The minority view in Sorrells, on the other hand, held that only 
the conduct of the police was relevant. In the latter view, the record of the 
accused and his predisposition played no role in the determination:
The applicable principle is that Courts must be closed to the trial o f  a crime 
instigated bv the governm ent’s own agents. \ o  other issue, comparison or equities 
as between the guilty official and the guilty defendant has any place in the en­
forcement o f thus over-ruling pnnciple of public policy.20 (emphasis added)
This approach has been referred to as the objective approach. O f these 
two views, those Canadian Courts which have recognized the defence of 
entrapm ent have opted for the subjective approach.-1 A discussion of why 
the objective approach is clearly preferable will follow shortly.
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The Amato case provided the Supreme Court of Canada with that 
“proper case” it sought in order to establish the Canadian position on the 
defence of entrapment. Of the nine justices, four held22 that, assuming it 
was a recognized defence, the facts of the case would not warrant its ap­
plication in this particular instance. Ritchie J. held that it was a recognized 
defence but that it had no application in this particular case. Estey J. held 
that it was a proper defence, and was applicable in this case.23 Although 
five justices accepted the proposition that entrapment was a recognized 
defence, they produced two versions as to how the defence should apply.
In a short judgment, Ritchie J. held that one should look to the ac­
cused’s character or record to determine the accused’s criminal predispo­
sition. For example, did the accused take advantage of an opportunity 
created by the police; or was his involvement with the crime “devised” 
through the creative activity of an agent provocateur} If the accused’s record 
is tarnished, then he cannot rely on the defence of entrapment, but if he 
can show that his record is blemish free, then it becomes a matter of lack 
of mem rea on the accused’s part. In the latter alternative the defence is 
established and the accused acquitted.24
Estey J. adopts the minority view as expressed in Sorrelb by Mr. Justice 
Roberts. The only issue on the inquiry here is the conduct of the police 
and their conduct alone. The test to determine whether the accused was 
entrapped becomes, not the predisposition of the accused, but whether the 
police scheme was such as to induce only those persons who would normally 
commit the crime, rather than those who would avoid it.25
Instigating and perpetuating a scheme to ensnare a criminal is not 
enough to bring the defence of entrapm ent into operation; “the scheme 
so perpetrated must in all circumstance be so shocking and outrageous as 
to bring the administration of justice into disrepute.”26 Consequently, this 
appears to be the full test of police conduct which gives rise to entrapment, 
and which the accused must meet in order to escape conviction.
Once accepted as a defence, and found to exist on the facts, the ques­
tion which remains to be answered is what will the remedy be? The proper 
remedy should be different than that proposed by Ritchie J. for two reasons. 
First of all, the question of intention or mens rea does not arise since it is 
the conduct of the police which is being scrutinized rather than the accused’s 
predisposition for committing the offence. Secondly, the defence of en-
22Dickson J ., M artland, Beetz, and  C houinard , ] J.. concurring .
'"C oncurred  in by Laskin C.J., M d n tv re  and  Lam er, JJ.
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trapm ent is not, in Mr. Justice Estey’s view, a defence in the traditional 
sense of the word:
A successful defers r If ~’.s 10 an acquittal on the charge, a determination that the 
offence has not been comr,.tued. Here, axiomatically, the crime from a physical point 
o f view at least has been committed. Indeed it may be that the necessary intent and 
act have combined to form a complete crime.'1'' (emphasis added)
The crime has been technically committed, but since the entire transaction 
has been “tainted” by police conduct, “the remedy in such a case, therefore, 
is a stay of prosecution, a denial of the courts to their improper use by the 
law enforcement agencies of the community.”28
The court’s power to enter a stay of prosecution is derived from its 
inherent jurisdiction to control its own process. Such a jurisdiction is re­
quired for several reasons, one of which is to ensure that the Court’s sense 
of justice is not violated.29 In his lengthy judgm ent, Estey J. canvasses the 
bulk of case law which deals with this point, in order to amply illustrate 
that courts are clothed with the power to enter a stay.
Finally, an inquiry must be made as to where this power to create new 
defences and to apply appropriate remedies stems from. In Kirzner, Laskin 
J. as he then was, in opposition to the Ontario Court of Appeal, held that 
section 7(3) of the Criminal Code o f Canada did more than merely preserve 
common law defences.30 In Amato Estey J. accepts the proposition put forth 
by the Chief Justice in Kirzner, and found the court’s power to adopt new 
defences, “if appropriate,” on the basis of section 7(3).31
In Amato, the Supreme Court of Canada has finally recognized en­
trapm ent as a defence. What remains to be decided is the nature of the 
test which must be met for the defence to apply. As noted, there are two 
views on this point. There is the subjective approach adopted by Ritchie J. 
who proposes as the applicable test the predisposition of the accused, which, 
if lacking, ought to result in an acquittal. On the other hand, there is the 
objective approach adopted by Estey J. which focuses on the conduct of 
the police and whether such conduct was such as to offend the community 
standard, thereby bringing the administration of justice into disrepute. If 
these two conditions are met, the proper remedy would be a stay of pros­
ecution.
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Of the two views, the latter is more acceptable. One reasons why Mr. 
Justice Estey’s view is preferable is that it would hardly be just to deny one 
an available defence on the basis of his having a prior record. An otherwise 
innocent person could be convicted regardless of the scheme!
Furthermore, the approach of Mr. Justice Ritchie conflicts with the 
policy reasons for giving effect to the defence of entrapment. The defence 
operates when the police have induced an innocent person into the com­
mission of an offence, through trickery or fraud. The court intervenes 
because such conduct is reprehensible and the stay of prosecution is a 
comment on that conduct. A test then, which “looks to the character and 
predisposition of the defendant rather than the conduct of the police loses 
sight of the underlying reasons for the defense of entrapm ent.”32
Amato illustrates one step in the acceptance of the defence of entrap­
ment. O ther important issues related to the defence must be determined 
in subsequent judgments. The major hurdle of recognizing the defence 
has, however been overcome with Amato.
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